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O.: Liability of a Telegraph Company to an Addressee for Non-Delivery
EDITORIAL XOTES

least, both defendants and plaintiffs might very justly be required
to show cause why one month is not sufficient time within which to
plead. The fact that an attorney is busy or indolent, or the fact
that a party plans unwarranted delay, may lead to more pleading
in court than do the legitimate demands of litigation. A remedy,
if desirable, must be sought in legislative enactment.
-L. C.

LiABILTY OF A TELEGRAPH COMPANY TO AN ADDRESS FOR NoN-DE-

OR FAILURE TO DE vER.-There is, perhaps, no legal
problem in which the true basis of recovery is more
controverted than that of the liability of a telegraph
company to an addressee. Where there has been an error in transmission recovery may be supported as grounded in
tort.' For non-delivery or delay in delivery, however, no principle
has been agreed upon. In England, although no case on this
latter point has been found, relief has been denied in cases of negligent transmission on grounds that would preclude recovery in
cases of delay or non-delivery.2 In America, however, almost universally the addressee is allowed recovery on some theory or other.3
One class of cases suggests that the sender makes the contract
with the telegraph company as agent for a disclosed principal, the
addressee. 4 Such a theory may be resorted to where the sender
acts primarily in the interests of the addressee.' In the ordinary
case, however, where he acts for himself or for a third party, such
an agency cannot be implied except as a legal fiction unwarranted
by the facts.0
Another group of cases treats the addressee as the beneficiary of
a contract between the sender and the telegraph company, and, on
the doctrine that a third party beneficiary to a contract may sue on
it, is allowed to recover in an action ex contractu.7 But this is
LIVERY

I

See POUND, OUTLINE OF A COURSE ON THE HISTORY AND SYSTEM OF THE COMMON

LAW, 47. See also 14 HARV. L. REV. 193, n. 1.
- Playford v. United Kingdom Electric Tel. Co., L. R. 4 Q. B. 706 (1869) ; Dickson V. Reuter's Tel. Co., 3 C. P. D. 1 (1877).
See also JONEs, TELE3 For a collection of cases see 30 L. R. A. (N. s.)1121.
GRAPH AND TELEPHONE COmPANIES, 2 ed., 604.
(N.
Y. 1866) ; Western
1
Daly
547
Tel.
Co.,
etc.
4 De Rutte v. New York
Union Tel. Co. v. Fenton. 52 Ind. 1 (1875) ; western Union Tel. Co. v. Heathcoat, 47
So. 139 (Ala. 1908) ; Ford v. Postal Tel. Cable Co., 124 Ala. 400, 27 So. 409
(1900).
r See WYMN, PUBLIC SERVICE CORPORATIONS, § 349.
6 Ford v. Postal Tel. Cable Co., supra.
7 Frazier v. Western Union Tel. Co., 45 Ore. 414. 78 Pac. 330 (1904) ; Western
Union Tel. Co. v. Adams, 75 Tex. 531, 12 S. W. 857 (1889). See 18 HARV. L. REV.
234.
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necessarily of restricted application since an addressee is often
injured where the contract was not really made for his benefit.
The decisions of Texas, the most persistent expositor of this doctrine, show the difficulties of working out justice consistently on
this basis. They seem to justify the criticism that the courts of
that jurisdiction hold the contract to be for the party who first
brings suit, whether he be sender or addressee.8 Further, it is
clear that in a contract action no recovery may be had for mental
anguish, yet the Texas cases do allow such damages. 9 They reach
this result on the very dubious ground that the Texas code abolishes the distinction between actions in tort and contract. Moreover, this theory is not available, of course, in those jurisdictions
where the right of a third person to sue upon a promise with which
he is not in legal privity is denied. It would seem, therefore, that
this doctrine, which is itself anomalous,10 is repudiated in several
jurisdictions," and which has no clearly defined boundaries even
where it is accepted 2 affords no satisfactory principle of recovery.
Another view is that the teleghaph company is in the category of
bailees for hire. It is argued that the addressee has a property in
the message and should recover for its wrongful detention like a4
13
This theory has not met with approval.
consignee of goods.
The message is not ,in this connection at least, treated as a chattel.
It is not subject to embezzlement, the identical message is not to be
carried but only its contents are to be communicated;l15 nor does
the measure of damages for failure to transmit and deliver have
any relation to any value of the message itself, except as such value
may be disclosed by the message or agreed on between the sender and
the company.'"
Another possible ground for recovery is tort. No cases where a
s Cf. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Adams, supra, and Potts v. Western Union Tel.
Co., 82 Tex. 545, iS S. W. 604 (1891).
9 Western Union Tel. Co., v. May, 8 Tex. Civ. App. 176, 27 S. W. 760 (1894).
See 30 L. R. A. (N. s.) 1142 for a collection of cases.
10 See WALD'S POLLOCK, CONTRACTS, 3 ed. 242.
11 See WALD'S POLLOCK, CONTRACTS, 3 ed. 249.

12 Postal Tel. Co. v. Ford, 117 Ala. 672, 23 So. 684 (1898), afflirmed, 124 Ala.
In this case the court refused to allow recovery on the
400, 27 So. 409 (1900).
ground the third party was merely benefited incidentally, though the message

was

one engaging his services.
ISee Young v. Western Union Tel. Co., 107 N. C. 370, 872, 11 S. E. 1044, 1046
(1890).
14 See Western Union Tel. Co. v. Allen, 66 Miss. V49, 556, 6 So. 461, 462 (1889).
- See 1 STREET, FOUNDATIONS Or LEGAL LIRILITY, 434.
18 See Primrose v. Western Union Tel. Co., 154 U. S. 14, 15 (1893).
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tort action for non-delivery or failure to deliver was allowed have
been found.1 7 The suggestion that tort liability furnishes the solution,"8 moreover, is negatived by cases holding that the addressee
is bound by the stipulations agreed upon by the sender and the
telegraph company."9 Further, in cases of erroneous transmission
where recovery is allowed on sound tort principles the addressee
has been held not to be bound by such stipulations. 20 It would
seem clear that this is correct. An agreement between A and B
cannot affect a duty arising out of tort which B owes to C.
A few courts, apparently in despair at the welter of principles
and authority, declare that if the addressee is to have a right to
sue it should come from the legislature. 1
There are some cases, however, which rest recovery on the ground
that a telegraph company is a public utility owing a duty to all
whom it serves, independent of the contractual one, if any, into
which it enters when it receives the message. 22 This, it is submitted, is the correct solution. There is a parallel in the history of the
development of theories as to public utilities in general which bears
out this conclusion. Beginning with an attempt to thrust all liabilities of public service corporations into the categories of contract
or bailment the courts are recognizing finally that the duties and
rights involved arise out of the relation between the public service company and the persons whom it serves.2 It is an obligation sui generis, sounding strictly neither in tort nor in contract
though both forms of action are allowed.24
17 "If
the duty of the telegraph company faithfully to transmit messages extends
to the addressee, it would result in a liability which would be unique in the law of torts."
15 HAav. L. REV. 143. There is authority expressly denying a tort liability in such
cases. Russell v. Western Union Tel. Co., 57 Kan. 230, 45 Pac. 598 (1896).
In
Dunham v. Western Union Tel. Co., 102 S. E. 113 (W. Va. 1920), and some other
cases, though the form of action was tort, the ground for liability was not.
Is See 1 STREET, FOUNDATIONS Or LEGAL LAB uTy,
439.
10 Russell v. Western Union Tel. Co., supra; Western Union Tel. Co. v. Waxelbaum, 113 Ga. 1017, 39 S. E. 443 (1901); Frazier v. Western Union Tel. Co.,
supra; Whitehill v. Western Union Tel. Co., 136 Fed. 499 (1905).
1 Webbe v. Western Union Tel. Co., 169 Ill. 610, 48 N. E. 670 (1897) ; Western
Union Tel. Co. v. McKibben, 114 Ind. 511, 14 N. E. 894 (1887).
See
2 Herron v. Western Union Tel. Co., 90 Ia. 129, 57 N. W. 696 (1594).
Wadsworth v. Western Union Tel. Co., 86 Tenn. 695, 707, 8 S. W. 574 (1888). See
also 24 HAIp. L. REV. 411.
= Ellis V. American Tel. Co., 13 Allen 234 (Mass. 1886) ; McGehee v. Western
Union Tel Co., 53 So. 205 (Ala. 1910).
See Pound, " The End of Law as Developed in Justice Thought," 30 HARV.
.....
L. REV. 219, "one may point to the law of public service companies.
In each case, and these are relatively recent judicial developments in our law, the
common law idea of relation and of the rights, duties and liabilities involved therein has prevailed at the expense of the idea of contract." See also WYMAN, PUBLIC
SERVICE CORPORATIONS, §§ 331-343.
" "The truth of the matter is that the obligation resting upon one who has
undertaken the performance of a public duty is sui generis. It cannot be forced into
the typical forms of action without artificiality, as experience has shown." WYMAN,
PUBLIC SERVICE CORPORATIONS, § 333.
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A recent West Virginia decision 5 has recognized , apparently,
the soundness of this view. The addressee in that case sued in
tort for failure to deliver a telegram to him. The company argued
that its liability should be limited by certain stipulations agreed
to by the sender of the telegram. The court said, "Although this
is an action of tort brought by the addressee, and not a suit on the
contract, nevertheless, these conditions, being reasonable regulations are binding on the addressee as well as the sender
. . . such provisions, when reasonable, are determinative of the
company's duty to the public, regardless of any contractual rela-

-G. B. 0.

tion. "26

JuDiciAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGMENT AS TO VALIDITY

op BONDs.-In 1917, the West Virginia Legislature passed an
. .or other municipalact' providing that before any "county.
ity" might issue bonds, payable by taxation, the validity of the
proposed indebtedness should first be approved by the Attorney
General. This officer was to have before him, the bonds, and "a
duly certified copy of all the orders, proclamations, notices, advertisements, affidavits and records and of all. . .proceedings connected with. . .said bond issue."12 This data was to be sent to
him by the municipality within two weeks after the popular vote
authorizing the bond issue. The Attorney General's approval was
to render the validity of the bonds forever incontestible in any
court, unl6ss, within ten days, some taxpayer or other person in interest filed a petition in the Supreme Court of Appeals, asking
that the action of the Attorney General be "reversed or modified."
The matter thus submitted was to be proceeded with by the Court
as in cases of original jurisdiction. All data before the Attorney
General, as well as a statement by that officer of the reasons underlying his decision, were to be presented to the Court, which was
then "to decide the matter in controversy and enter such order
thereon as to it may seem to be just." 3
The recent West Virginia case of State ex. rel. Allen v. England,4
raises the interesting question as to whether the type of judicial
control of the Attorney General's action contemplated by this
2

Dunham v. western Union Tel. Co., supra.

'

Ibid., 116.

1 ACTS OP W. VA. 1917, c. 57.
2 Ibid., § 1.
2. 400 (W. Va. 1920).
3 4103
Ibid., S.§ 2.
the Court.

Mr. Justice Miller delivered the opinion of

Mr. Justice Ritz dissented from the reasoning.
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